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When William and Janine married they both knew that they wanted to have
a family. After several years of childlessness, they visited the Fairfield Fertility
Center and attempted in vitro fertilization. Three embryos were implanted and
an additional three were cryopreserved for future implantation efforts. Janine
became pregnant but miscarried after six weeks. Several months later she was
diagnosed with ovarian cancer. Janine received radiation therapy, which
successfully treated her cancer but impaired her ability to produce additional
viable eggs. Shortly thereafter, William filed for divorce.
William and Janine are able to agree about the disposition of all their assets
except one—the frozen embryos. William wants them destroyed. He does not
want to be a parent to any children who might result. Janine wants to
implant the embryos and she is willing to assume full social and financial
responsibility for the children. The embryos are, she states, her best and likely
last chance at genetic parenthood. While sympathetic to Janine’s parental
impulses, the trial court follows existing precedent, which seeks, above all, to
avoid creating unwanted genetic links between adults and potential biological
children. The court orders the embryos destroyed.
INTRODUCTION
Developments in the highly refined arena of assisted reproduction
pose legal puzzles that force a re-examination of concepts we thought
that we understood. The disaggregation of gestational, genetic, and
child-rearing functions challenges us to think more deeply about the
1
creation of maternal, paternal, or familial status. Active trading in
1. Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), with Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), and McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994). In Baby M, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated a traditional surrogacy
contract, refusing to terminate ties between the woman and the child conceived by
her egg and through her gestational services. In that case, the contractual intent that
another woman and the child’s biological father raise the child did not govern. Baby
M, 537 A.2d at 1240. In Johnson, the California Supreme Court upheld a gestational
surrogacy arrangement on the grounds that the biological mother’s intention to rear
the child trumped the surrogate’s claim, which was based solely on the surrogate’s
provision of gestational services. 851 P.2d at 781-82. In McDonald, sperm of the
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4

the egg, sperm, and womb markets and the growth of designer
families force us to rethink the assumption that blood is thicker than
5
contractual ink.
husband was used to fertilize a donated egg that was later implanted in the wife’s
womb. Following separation, the father demanded custody of the child on the
grounds that he was the only parent genetically related to the child. The court,
however, cited the Johnson language that notes that gestational and biological
relationships constitute equivalent claims to parentage, which could be strengthened
by a showing of the intent to parent. Because the gestational mother also possessed
the intent to rear the child, the court declared her the natural mother and granted
her custodial rights to the child. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80; Johnson, 851 P.2d
at 782.
2. An online egg donor and embryo adoption program directory lists sixteen
programs across the country, with more worldwide. For instance, the Reproductive
Specialty Center offers $6,000 for the eggs of intelligent and talented women
between the ages of eighteen to thirty. REPRODUCTIVE SPECIALTY CENTER, at
http://www.drary.com/needed.htm (last visited June 28, 2004) (on file with the
American University Law Review). Another egg donation company, Fertility
Alternatives, Inc., offers an “exceptional donors” roster, where donors of diverse
ethnic heritage and academic achievement auction their genetic material for as
much as $10,000.
FERTILITY ALTERNATIVES, INC., EGG DONOR AND SURROGATE
DATABASE, at http://www.faeggdonors.com/exceptional8.html.
3. Online sperm directories list eighty-eight sperm banks across the United
States, including specialized repositories targeting donors of particular ethnicity,
intellectual prowess, and privacy inclinations. For example, Rainbow Flag Health
Services actively recruits gay and bisexual donors. RAINBOW FLAG HEALTH SERVICES, at
http://www.gayspermbank.com (last visited June 28, 2004) (on file with the
American University Law Review). Repository for Germinal Choice in California,
commonly referred to as the Nobel Prize Sperm Bank, aims to improve humanity “by
increasing the proportion of advantageous genes in the human gene pool.”
REPOSITORY FOR GERMINAL CHOICE, at http://www.princeton.edu/~wws320/Second%
20Pages/05Infertility/artificial%20insem/Nobel%20Sperm%20Bank/topRGC.htm
(last visited Apr. 9, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review). Pacific
Reproductive Services in California offers sperm donors who are “willing-to-be
known” for the child’s biological heritage. PACIFIC REPRODUCTIVE SERVICES, at
http://www.hellobaby.com (2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review). New England Cryogenic Center screens all sperm donors for objective
factors, such as health and age, as well as for subjective factors, such as intelligence,
physical characteristics, looks and personality. NEW ENGLAND CRYOGENIC CENTER, at
http://www.necryogenic.com (2000) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
The Fairfax Cryobank Sperm Storage for the Cancer Patient in
Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Texas caters to cancer patients who wish to preserve
sperm prior to undergoing chemotherapy.
FAIRFAX CRYOBANK, at
http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com (last visited June 28, 2004) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
4. See Kari L. Karsjens, Boutique Egg Donations: A New Form of Racism and
Patriarchy, 5 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 57, 84-86, 88-89 (2002) (critiquing the
recruitment of “blue ribbon” egg donors for its “oppressive medical paternalism” and
advocating curtailing egg donation as “violative of basic social justice norms”).
5. A person who has neither donated gametes nor performed gestational
services may, nevertheless, become a parent by intent or by virtue of having caused
the conception of a child. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that when a husband consents to the procreation
of a child through modern reproductive technology, he causes the conception “every
bit as much as if things had been done the old-fashioned way”); see also Richard F.
Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach
to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 602-40 (2002) (noting the complexities with which
the courts must wrestle in determining the legal rights of mothers and surrogate
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Technologies, such as intra-cytoplasmic mitochondrial transfer,
that allow for the transfer of some, but not all, of a party’s genetic
material, similarly require analysis of the nature of kinship—this time
6
at the cellular level. The cloning techniques that produced Dolly the
Sheep and other animal replicas have led us to ponder the difference
7
between procreation and replication, and the significance of a
8
return to asexual reproduction. In much the same way, the frozen
parents); Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the Law,
23 VT. L. REV. 225, 236, 245 n.135 (1998) (pointing out that donations to a fertility
clinic produced genetic siblings that were then given to different couples). See
generally John C. Sheldon, Surrogate Mothers, Gestational Carriers, and a Pragmatic
Adaptation of the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, 53 ME. L. REV. 523, 533-38 (2001)
(outlining the possible combinations of a fetus’ genetic material resulting from the
donations of a husband, wife, or other donor). At least one commentator has
criticized the notion of intent-based parenting, arguing that it expressly requires a
reliance on principles of contract, thereby rejecting traditional notions of family
formation. See Janet L. Dolgin, The “Intent” of Reproduction: Reproductive Technologies
and the Parent-Child Bond, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1261, 1310-14 (1994) (noting the failure
of American jurisprudence to keep up with issues surrounding reproductive
technology).
6. The majority of a cell’s genetic material is contained in the nucleus.
However, a minor fraction of genetic material is found in cytoplasmic structures
known as mitochondria, which play a central role in metabolism. During
fertilization, the DNA of the sperm and the egg will merge to form the nuclear
genetic material of the oocyte. However, the DNA of the mitochondria will be
inherited exclusively from the mother to the offspring through the cytoplasm of the
fertilized egg. In cases where the mitochondrial DNA encodes a dysfunctional gene,
the faulty gene is always inherited and may cause disease in both the mother and her
children. To prevent the transfer of the dysfunctional gene to future generations,
the mother’s nuclear DNA may be transferred from her egg to the egg of a healthy
donor through the extraction and injection of the entire nucleus. A donor of
cytoplasm will thus make a contribution to the child’s genetic composition, thereby
achieving partial genetic parenthood. Because the mitochondrial DNA is transferred
in its entirety from mother to child, the donor’s DNA will be passed on in an
unmodified form to future generations. Therefore, the claim to genetic parenthood
will be relatively weak if the amount of the donor’s DNA is considered but will be
much stronger if the future impact of the donation is taken into consideration. See
John A. Robertson, Oocyte Cytoplasm Transfers and the Ethics of Germ-Line Intervention, 26
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 211, 212-16 (1998) (discussing the potential of oocyte cytoplasm
transfers as a means for overcoming infertility).
7. See George J. Annas, Human Cloning: Should the United States Legislate Against
It?, 83 A.B.A. J. 80, 80 (1997) (stating that “[c]loning is replication, not
reproduction, and represents a difference in kind, not in degree, in the way humans
continue the species”); see also Lori Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive
Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 60 (2000) (urging for a ban on cloning because
“[t]he notion of replicating existing humans seems to fundamentally conflict with
our legal system, which emphatically protects individuality and uniqueness”); Lori
Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning,
11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 667-70 (1998) (arguing that the potential physical and
psychological risks of reproductive cloning are sufficiently compelling to justify
banning cloning altogether).
8. Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, 216 NEW REPUBLIC 17, 21 (1997)
(noting that “[a]sexual reproduction, which produces ‘single-parent’ offspring, is a
radical departure from the natural human way, confounding all normal
understandings of father, mother, sibling, grandparent, etc., and all moral relations
tied thereto”).
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embryo cases require that we look closely at rights and interests that
have been present in our legal vernacular for many decades.
The frozen embryo cases arise out of the marital dissolution of
couples who, while together, pursued fertility treatment and
9
10
cryopreserved extra preembryos for future implantation attempts.
When, upon divorce, these couples disagree as to what should be
done with the frozen embryos, the courts must assess and weigh the
competing reproductive interests of each spouse. In these cases, the
right to procreate is pitted squarely against the right to avoid
procreation.
Although courts have deemed the rights to procreate and to avoid
procreation “fundamental” and of “constitutional significance,” these
designations attached in cases in which the state threatened to
11
encroach on intimate personal and familial decision-making. In the
9. The frozen embryo cases generally refer to the subject of the litigation as
either pre-zygotes or preembryos. Pre-zygotes are defined as, “eggs which have been
penetrated by sperm but have not yet joined genetic material.” Kass v. Kass, 696
N.E.2d 174, 175 n.1 (N.Y. 1998). Preembryos are defined as “that stage in human
development immediately after fertilization occurs. The preembryo ‘comes into
existence with the first cell division and lasts until the appearance of a single
primitive streak, which is the first sign of organ differentiation. This [primitive
streak] occurs at about fourteen days of development.’” In re Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48
P.3d 261, 262 n.2 (Wash. 2002) (citing Donna Katz, My Egg, Your Sperm, Whose
Preembryo? A Proposal for Deciding which Party Receives Custody of Preembryos, 5 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 623, 628-29 n.42 (1998) (internal citations omitted).
10. See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (involving a custody
battle over a couple’s seven frozen embryos); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 181-82 (holding
that, after entry of divorce, the previous agreements regarding the custody of prezygotes remained valid); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (holding that the
former wife of the appellant had a fundamental right not to procreate); A.Z. v. B.Z.,
725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (prohibiting a wife to utilize frozen embryos); Litowitz,
48 P.3d at 261 (ordering the disposition of preembryos upon the dissolution of
marriage). Additional cases in which divorcing couples have tussled over frozen
embryos exist. See, e.g., Bohn v. Ann Arbor Reprod. Med. Assoc., No. 213550, 1999
WL 33327194 (Mich. App. Dec. 17, 1999) (noting that the embryos would remain
frozen and in the possession of the reproduction clinic until the couple had resolved
the disagreement); Wendel v. Wendel, No. D-191962 (Ohio C.P. Dom. Rel. Ct. July
21, 1989). See John Robertson, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 411 (1990). However, this
Article will limit discussion to those cases that have percolated through the state
courts and that have resulted in state supreme court decisions.
11. The constitutional rights to achieve and to avoid procreation are
characterized by longstanding histories and fuzzy borders. Since the early part of the
last century, Supreme Court opinions have affirmed the importance of individual
aspirations in the domestic sphere. However, the exact reach of the constitutional
protection accorded these aspirations remains unclear.
The right to avoid procreation was recognized initially as a right possessed by the
state in its parens patria power to secure the public health. In the notorious 1927 case
of Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute authorizing the
sterilization of “mental defectives.” 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927). Writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes opined, “[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.” Id. at 207. The
individual’s right to determine, without interference, his or her own reproductive
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frozen embryo cases, couples do not challenge state law’s intrusion
into their private sphere of decisional autonomy. Rather, the state is
called upon to mediate a dispute between individuals with conflicting
reproductive desires. In this posture, the three-tiered analytical
structure reserved for governmental incursions on individual rights
does not apply.
Courts are therefore unencumbered by the
constraints of the strict scrutiny test and the elasticity of the rational-

course received more considered reflection in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the
Supreme Court held that constitutional privacy protected a married couple’s use of
birth control measures. 381 U.S. 479, 505 (1965). Seven years later in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, the Court held that the privacy interest in determining “whether to bear or
beget a child” exists for unmarried and married persons alike. 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972). Expanding upon these earlier delineations of a “right of privacy,” the
Supreme Court held the right “broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
At the opposite end of the procreation spectrum, the genealogy of the right to
procreate is commonly traced to Meyer v. Nebraska, a 1923 case in which the Supreme
Court affirmed the due process clause’s protection of the individual right “to marry,
establish a home and bring up children.” 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923). The lineage
continues with Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, which struck down a law that required
parents to send their children to public school as “interfer[ing] with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.” 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Several decisions further strengthen the
constitutional status of the right to procreate: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942), which struck down, on equal protection grounds, a criminal statute
authorizing the sterilization of thrice-convicted felons, and declaring “[m]arriage
and procreation [to be] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race;”
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), which found that restricting the freedom to
marry solely because of racial classifications violated the central meaning of the equal
protection clause and deprived persons of their liberty without due process of law;
and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972), which found that parents have a
constitutionally protected due process right to a fitness hearing before children are
removed from their custody. Cases involving state restrictions on collaborative
reproduction using Assisted Reproductive Techniques (“ARTs”) have suggested that
the constitutional right to procreate extends to in vitro fertilization and artificial
insemination. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 631 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that a prisoner had the fundamental right to reproduce via nonsexual means, such as
artificial insemination); see also Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (finding that a statute limiting the sale of and the experimentation on a
fetus produced by asexual means impermissibly restricts a woman’s fundamental
right to make reproductive choices free of governmental interference); In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227, 1250-56 (N.J. 1988) (holding that the fundamental right to
reproduce includes the right to use ARTs such as artificial insemination to produce,
though not to raise exclusively, a child).
Media flashes detailing break-through cloning efforts continue to prompt
extensive commentary as to whether the right to procreate includes the right to
clone. See Elizabeth Price Foley, Human Cloning and the Right to Reproduce, 65 ALB. L.
REV. 625, 627-29 (2002) (comparing the judicial treatment of traditional sexual
reproduction with the treatment of assisted reproductive techniques such as in vitro
fertilization and cloning); see also George J. Annas et al., Protecting the Endangered
Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28
AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 173 (2002) (proposing the prohibition of all efforts to initiate a
pregnancy by using either intentionally modified genetic material or human
replication cloning).
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relation test. In this analytical tabula rasa, the courts must peer
behind the labels and more deeply assess the values and interests
embodied in these countervailing rights.
The five state supreme courts that have ruled on frozen embryo
disputes have signaled that the right to avoid procreation requires
13
greater legal protection than does the right to procreate. In
reaching this conclusion, the courts have emphasized the negative
right to be free of unwanted familial relations. This right, in the
courts’ views, supersedes the interest in forging important familial
connections and in achieving genetic parenthood.
Judicial discussion of the burdens of “unwanted parenthood” is
14
both terse and Delphic. Nonetheless, what emerges is a judicial
presumption that the existence of a biological tie precipitates strong
15
psychological ties.
That is, the courts assume that the objecting
spouse will, by virtue of biology, be psychologically connected to any
children that might result from the embryos created with the exspouse. If the embryos are brought to term, the courts surmise that
the objecting spouse will face two equally unpalatable options. The
strength of the parental bond will lead the spouse either to pursue a
12. See Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1123 (1998) (arguing that the constitutional right to privacy
protects relationships, not individuals, and that, once “individuals involved in
reproduction are at odds, then the right of relational privacy fails to insulate
them . . . from [either] the state or from the claims of one another”).
13. See infra note 14.
14. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J.
2001); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); In re the Marriage of Litowitz v.
Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
Out of these five state supreme court opinions, only the Kass, J.B., and Davis courts
mentioned the burdens of unwanted parenthood. However, even those opinions
dealt very briefly with the subject. The J.B. court mentioned briefly the burdens of
unwanted parenthood three times in its opinion. 783 A.2d at 711, 716-19. The Davis
court delved into the subject of unwanted parenthood slightly further when
discussing Mr. Davis’s wish to avoid parenthood as a divorcee. 842 S.W.2d at 603-04.
Academic commentary on these cases also gives short shrift to this topic.
Numerous articles engage the general question of whether and under what
conditions dispositional agreements should be enforced. See Ellen A. Waldman,
Disputing Over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 900 (1999)
(noting that contracts can play an important role in determining the legal rights of
parents and donors concerning embryos); see also Howard Fink & June Carbone,
Between Private Ordering and Public Fiat: A New Paradigm for Family Law Decision-Making,
5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2 (2003) (discussing the use of contracts to resolve embryo
disputes). Others consider whether courts are correctly siding with the party seeking
procreation-avoidance.
Compare Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and
Contemporaneous Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84
MINN. L. REV. 55, 71 (1999) (agreeing that courts should grant the party seeking
procreation-avoidance an automatic veto), with Judith Daar, Frozen Embryo Disputes
Revisited: A Trilogy of Procreation-Avoidance Approaches, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 197, 199
(2001) (disagreeing with the grant of an automatic veto).
15. See infra Part I.
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social relationship with the resulting child, thereby drawing time,
energy, and psychological resources away from relationships and
endeavors that better reflect the spouse’s autonomous choice, or to
turn away from the child and to suffer a permanent and agonal sense
16
of loss.
Although other factors influence the courts’ stance, the concern
for the psychological welfare of the objecting spouse appears to be
the engine driving frozen embryo jurisprudence. To be sure, the
courts have not ignored the potential financial obligations facing the
17
objecting spouse. While the disputing spouse could reach a private
agreement to release the objecting spouse from support obligations,
18
such a contract would not be enforceable. On the other hand, in a
number of cases, a two-parent couple had planned to adopt any
frozen embryo brought to term, and thus, the objecting spouse would
19
have been released from financial responsibility. In those cases, the
courts were concerned with the serious burden that unwanted
parenthood would impose. These burdens, it seems clear, rest in the
disruption and attenuation of psychological attachments brought
into being by genetic relation. Biology, according to the courts,
catalyzes this psychological attachment, and psychological
20
parenthood constitutes the biological parent’s destiny.
Although embraced by the courts, this account of parenthood is
belied by the widespread phenomena of paternal disengagement, as
well as by the long-standing practice of sperm donation. Empirical
investigations into both of these social practices suggest that
parenthood—or at least fatherhood—is, in large part, socially
constructed rather than biologically pre-determined.
Inquiries into the causes and effects of “the disappearing American
father” reveal that the development of a paternal self-concept is
shaped by a confluence of exogenous factors. Residential proximity,
relationship with the child’s mother, familial and community norms,
age, and maturity all play a role in determining whether genetic ties
21
evolve into social relationships.
Additionally, surveys of sperm
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part I.
18. See Grijalva v. Grijalva, 310 S.E.2d 193, 197 (W. Va. 1983) (finding that “[t]he
continuing jurisdiction of a circuit court over child support is based on the axiomatic
proposition that parents cannot contract away the rights of their children”).
19. See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001) (noting M.B. intended to
donate the frozen embryos to childless couples); see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 590 (Tenn. 1992) (acknowledging that Mrs. Davis wished to donate the frozen
embryos to childless couples).
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Part II.
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donor attitudes and motivation reveal that the genetic links between
donors and offspring do not typically inspire psychological bonds.
Similar neglect of relevant data produces other distortions in the
courts’ analysis. Inattention to the impediments hindering the
pursuit of parenthood through adoption or Assisted Reproduction
Techniques (“ARTs”) leads courts to undervalue the interest in
achieving procreation through the use of existing frozen embryos. A
number of judges have suggested that existing frozen embryos should
almost never be used over one spouse’s objection because the spouse
22
seeking parenthood can always adopt children. In the same vein,
other judges have suggested that alternative efforts at ARTs should be
attempted before the existing embryo is released for use. In so
doing, these courts fail to acknowledge the physical and the
emotional trauma inherent in hormonal stimulation and egg
extraction, as well as the considerable challenges faced by older
single women in attempting to achieve parenthood through
adoption.
Further consideration of the hardships forced upon women when
existing embryos are ordered destroyed strengthens the argument in
favor of increased deference to the interest in using existing embryos.
Moreover, the fragile correspondence between biological ties and
social and psychological parenthood buttresses the argument against
according paramount status to the genetic progenitor’s interest in
avoiding genetic links. A woman’s investment in existing embryos as
a path to parenthood is dramatically context contingent. So, too, is a
man’s propensity to psychologically attach to the offspring of former
marriage partners.
Presumptions, in favor either of avoiding
procreation or of achieving it, are unwarranted. Instead, the courts
should assess frozen embryo cases on their facts while considering
both the woman’s reliance interest in existing embryos and the
presence of factors that predict parental disengagement and
withdrawal. While a multi-factored consideration of each parent’s
interests challenges courts to adopt a more complex decision-making
process, consideration of social science insights, as well as the harsh
biological reality facing older would-be mothers would result in a
more nuanced, more insightful, and, ultimately, fairer treatment of
competing reproductive interests.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I of this Article briefly surveys
the frozen embryo cases that have resulted in state supreme court
22. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Friedmann, J.,
concurring), aff’d, 696 N.E.2d 174 (1998); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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ruling, pointing out the courts’ heavy emphasis on the right to avoid
procreation and their ready dismissal of the interest in genetic
parenthood. Part II discusses the contingent nature of psychological
parenthood, drawing first on studies relating to paternal
disengagement, and second on data exploring sperm donor attitudes
toward donation and offspring. Part III explores the investments that
women likely have in existing embryos and the lack of alternative
reproductive options that exist for single, older women. This part
argues that the burdens of “forced parenthood”—usually claimed by
men—are not sufficiently weighty, and that the investments of the
procreation-seeking party—usually the woman—are not sufficiently
weak to justify existing judicial treatment. This Article concludes by
arguing that wholesale presumptions in this arena are unsound and
offers a framework for courts to use in weighing and prioritizing the
conflicting interests of the parties. While eliminating presumptions
introduces a degree of uncertainty, such uncertainty is the price to be
paid for more nuanced assessments. Furthermore, the use of
guidelines will confine uncertainty to acceptable levels, while allowing
for thoughtful consideration of the strength of competing
reproductive interests.
I.

THE CASES
23

A. In re the Marriage of Litowitz v. Litowitz

Although beginning the analysis with the Litowitz case defies
chronology, it aptly illustrates the result-oriented jurisprudence of
this body of case law. In Litowitz, Becky and David Litowitz sought the
assistance of an egg donor to create embryos fertilized with Mr.
24
Litowitz’s sperm. Upon divorce, Becky Litowitz sought possession of
25
the embryos in an effort to augment her post-divorce family. The
trial court looked solely at the “best interests” of the embryos and
awarded them to Mr. Litowitz, ordering him to donate them to an
26
infertile couple as Mr. Litowitz had requested. According to the
23. 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
24. Id. at 262.
25. Id. at 264.
26. Id. Many commentators argue that the “best interest test” is indeterminate
and allows judicial reasoning to be influenced by interests apart from the child’s. See
Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
4-11, 29 (1987) (noting the indeterminacy of the test and arguing that parental
interests should be included in the analysis); see also David L. Chambers, Rethinking
the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 569 (1984)
(recommending a search for alternatives to the “best interest test,” such as
encouraging negotiation and mediation services); Katharine T. Bartlett, Children and
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court, awarding the embryos to Mrs. Litowitz would not have been in
the resulting child’s best interests because then the child would have
27
Instead, the
been raised by someone single, divorced, and old.
court ordered the preembryos to Mr. Litowitz “with orders to use his
best efforts for adoption to a two-parent, husband and wife family
28
outside the State of Washington.”
The Washington Appellate Court affirmed the result but focused
on the procreational rights of the couple rather than the interests of
29
the embryos. The court held that Mrs. Litowitz’s right to procreate
did not encompass possessory rights to a preembryo to which she
30
donated no genetic material. Because only Mr. Litowitz could claim
a genetic link to the preembryos, he was granted sole dispositional
31
authority to “dispose of the preembryos as he chooses.”
32
Like other courts, the Washington Appellate Court was unwilling
33
to force Mr. Litowitz to become a father. However, the court found
that financial and psychological ties are created by “the long-term
34
obligations of parenting, [and] not the brief act of procreating.” In
other words, the court advanced a conception of parenthood that
emphasized social roles rather than biological ties. It assumed that
Mr. Litowitz would not suffer a sense of loss when separated from a
child whom he helped conceive but would not raise. Working with a
functional rather than a biological status-based definition of parental
self-concept, the court was confident that those who perform parental
activities would feel parental bonds, while those who do not perform
such activities would feel a less compelling level of attachment. By
adopting a more context-dependent position on parenthood than
the trial court, the appellate court determined that it could preserve

Divorce: Custody and Support Issues, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 482 (1999) (arguing
that the “best interest test” is not the best for children because “the child’s best
interests cannot be determined by comparing alternatives against a set of substantive
state-prescribed norms”).
27. Litowitz v. Litowitz, No. 97-3-00195-1 (Sup. Ct. Pierce County Dec. 11, 1998)
(stating that either “the child would be a child of a single parent [and not] have an
opportunity to be brought up by two parents . . . [or] the child may have a life of
turmoil as the child of divorced parents” and noting that “both parties are old
enough to be the grandparents of any child, and that is not an ideal circumstance”).
28. Id.
29. Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086, 1092 (Wash. App. 2000), rev’d, 48 P.3d 261
(Wash. 2002).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1093.
32. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (holding that a spouse had the
fundamental right not to become a parent).
33. Litowitz, 10 P.3d at 1091.
34. Id. at 1092.
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Mr. Litowitz’s right to avoid unwanted parenthood if the embryos
35
were donated to an out-of-state couple for adoption.
The Washington Supreme Court did not agree. Though it did not
directly address the question of what the right to procreate entails,
the court supplied its own definition of what the right to avoid
procreation requires.
Because preserving the right to avoid
procreation means that the embryos do not advance toward birth, the
court ordered the embryos destroyed. Despite the fact that neither
party sought destruction of the embryos, the court side-stepped the
question of what constitutes parenthood by finding that the
Litowitzes’ signed cryopreservation documents demanded the
36
embryos be thawed.
Given Becky Litowitz’s zealous battle for ownership, the court’s
reading is peculiar. The cryopreservation documents only authorized
embryo destruction if the embryos were no longer “wanted or
37
needed.”
Additionally, the couple agreed elsewhere in the
documents that if they were unable to decide what should be done
38
with the embryos, they would petition a court for instructions.
Inexplicably, the Washington Supreme Court found that provision
39
inapplicable.
The court’s contrived reading of the fertility clinic forms reveals its
determination to reach the desired goal of embryo destruction. The
Washington Supreme Court never proclaimed its aim to protect Mr.
40
Litowitz’s right to avoid unwanted family ties.
However, its
insistence on the embryos’ destruction, when neither party was so
requesting, reveals a reluctance to recognize a genetic link incapable
of developing into social and psychological parenthood.
Although the Litowitz opinion is perhaps the most transparent of
the frozen embryo cases, it is merely the last in a line of resultoriented cases. With varying degrees of insincerity and ingenuity, the
courts have actively worked to avoid creating unwanted genetic ties.
They have stressed the burdens of “forced parenthood” while
dismissing the hardships associated with creating existing embryos
35. Id. at 1092-93.
36. In re the Marriage of Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002)
(stating that “[i]t is not necessary to engage in a legal, medical or philosophical
discussion whether the preembryos . . . are ‘children,’ nor whether [the wife] (who
was not a biological participant) is a progenitor as is [the husband] (who was a
biological participant). We base our decision . . . solely upon the contractual
rights . . . under the preembryo cryopreservation contract”).
37. Id. at 263-64.
38. Id. at 263.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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and the hurdles blocking the way to parenthood through other
means. This tradition of over-valuing procreation-avoidance and
under-valuing interests both in existing embryos and in the parental
41
experience began in 1992 with the celebrated Davis v. Davis case.
B. Davis v. Davis
Davis was the first case of its type to reach a state supreme court.
After years of infertility efforts, the Davises had cryopreserved seven
42
preembryos but had not achieved a successful pregnancy. When
they divorced, the husband, Mr. Davis, sought destruction of the
embryos, while the wife, Mrs. Davis, sought to donate the embryos to
43
a childless couple. Because the couple had not entered into any
agreements regarding embryo disposition, the court’s holding
focused entirely on the parties’ conflicting rights to attain or avoid
44
genetic parenthood.
The Davis opinion illustrates the power of facts to propel analyses
in directions that will likely cause future mischief. The court began
its analysis by declaring the legal and moral equivalence of the rights
45
to achieve or refrain from procreation. Because of this equivalence,
the court eschewed bright-line rules in favor of a balancing test that
considers “the positions of the parties, the significance of their
interests, and the relative burdens that will be imposed by differing
46
resolutions.”
Strangely, the court concluded its discussion by
establishing a presumption that significantly favored procreation47
avoiders in future cases.
The Davis court took this position in large part because of Mr.
Davis’s testimony, which suggested that, because of his family
background, he had an especially strong interest in avoiding a
41. 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that, where a dispute exists
regarding custody of the preembryos, generally the party seeking to destroy the
embryos has a greater interest).
42. Id. at 591-92.
43. Id. at 589-90.
44. See id. at 603-04 (looking at the various burdens imposed on the relevant
parties when confronted with a constraint on parental autonomy).
45. See id. at 601 (acknowledging the legal symmetry of the parties’ claims by
commenting that both rights were of constitutional significance). The court
similarly implied that both interests, the right to achieve and the right to avoid
procreation, were equally central to an individual’s life goals and fulfillment. Id.
The court noted that “in light of the joys of parenthood that is desired or the relative
anguish of a lifetime of unwanted parenthood . . . Mrs. Davis and Mr. Davis must be
seen as entirely equivalent gamete-providers.” Id.
46. Id. at 603.
47. See id. at 604 (explaining that “[o]rdinarily, the party wishing to avoid
procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility
of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in question”).
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genetic link with the embryos in storage. Mr. Davis appealed to the
court as the child of an unhappy divorce. Mr. Davis described how
his parents’ split had fractured his family and damaged his
relationships with both parents. He explained that the divorce ended
his cohabitation with either parent, that future contacts with his
mother were sporadic, and that those with his father were close to
48
nonexistent. Mr. Davis testified that the divorce and the separation
from his parents, especially his father, was deeply wounding and led
him to object strongly to the possibility that his biological progeny
49
would be raised without his full presence and nurture. He told the
court that if the embryos were brought to term, he would fight for
custody. If adoption were permitted, he would be haunted by the
prospect that the recipient couple might divorce, thus leaving his
biological progeny to suffer the same pangs of abandonment that he
50
experienced as a child.
The court, sympathetic to Mr. Davis’ plight, eloquently re-packaged
his claims as an appeal to preserve both his autonomy and his
psychological tranquility. Specifically, if the embryos were brought to
term and donated to a childless couple, Mr. Davis “would face a
lifetime of either wondering about his parental status or knowing
51
about his parental status but having no control over it.” Further,
“[d]onation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice—his
procreational autonomy would be defeated and his relationship with
52
his offspring would be prohibited.” Because Mrs. Davis no longer
sought implantation for the purpose of fulfilling her own
reproductive aims, the court concluded that Mr. Davis’ interests
53
trumped those of his ex-wife. Unfortunately, rather than remaining
true to the balancing test it had articulated, the court adopted a
presumption that, “[o]rdinarily, the party seeking to avoid
54
procreation should prevail.” This presumption is inapplicable only
if the other party lacks “a reasonable possibility of achieving
parenthood by [other] means,” such as adoption or additional,
statistically dubious attempts at conceiving through In Vitro
55
Fertilization (“IVF”). In ordering the embryos destroyed, the court
48. Id. at 603-04.
49. See id. at 604 (articulating Mr. Davis’ fears of “psychological obstacles” that
the child would face).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. (stating that, because Mrs. Davis sought to donate the preembryos, her
interests should not prevail).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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claimed that the rule it established did “not contemplate the creation
56
of an automatic veto.” Despite this language, an absolute veto is
exactly what objecting spouses have exercised in subsequent frozen
embryo cases.
C. Kass v. Kass
57

In Kass v. Kass, the parties had signed informed consent
58
documents that discussed embryo disposition. Thus, the plurality at
the New York intermediate and high courts finessed the question of
the parties’ conflicting procreational rights by resolving the dispute
59
on contractual grounds. Though the informed consent documents
were internally inconsistent and ambiguous, majorities on both
courts held that the couple had unequivocally indicated its intent to
60
destroy the embryos in the event of divorce.
While the plurality at the intermediate level limited its discussion
to contractual matters, concurring Justice Friedmann and dissenting
Justices Miller and Altman articulated conflicting assumptions that
animate, yet remain obliquely stated in, the frozen embryo cases.
Justice Friedmann, in parting company with the majority’s dodge,
found the informed consent documents inconclusive and
61
insufficiently clear to resolve the dispute. Instead, he argued that
the court should adopt the Davis presumption in favor of
procreation-avoidance, limited by a proviso narrowing the situations
62
in which exceptions to embryo destruction would be made.

56. Id.
57. 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aff’d, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
58. See id. at 583-84 (describing an informed consent document in which the
couple decided that the IVF program could retain the preembryos if the couple were
unable to jointly make a decision regarding the preembryos’ disposition).
59. See id. at 588 (basing its decision on the “clear and unambiguous” language
within the informed consent agreement); Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 181-82 (agreeing with
the lower court that the informed consent documents “unequivocally manifest” the
intent of the parties and should therefore determine the disposition of the
preembryos).
60. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 588 (agreeing with the defendant that, because the
couple could not jointly decide on the disposition of the preembryos, as required by
the contract, the preembryos must be retained and used by the IVF program); Kass,
696 N.E.2d at 181-82 (referring to the divorce instrument signed by both parties to
settle any ambiguity found in the consent agreement).
61. See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 592 (Friedmann, J., concurring) (arguing that the
consent agreement was “susceptible of multiple and conflicting interpretations” but
ultimately agreeing with the plurality that the preembryos should be donated to the
IVF program).
62. See id. (arguing that the party objecting to the implementation of the
preembryos maintains a liberty interest to avoid procreation, which should prevail
over the interests of the party who seeks to procreate).

WALDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1036

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/3/2004 5:35 PM

[Vol. 53:1021

Justice Friedmann made clear his rationale for supporting a more
aggressive procreation-avoidance approach. Opining on the serious
burdens entailed in forced parenthood, Justice Friedmann
proclaimed that:
Once a child is born, there is no way to end biological ties, and very
few ways to end emotional ones . . . . Put somewhat differently,
‘even if no rearing duties or even contact result[s], the
unconsenting partner [the former spouse] will know that biologic
offspring exist, with the powerful attendant reverberations of guilt,
63
attachment, or responsibility which that knowledge can ignite.’

Because of the serious psychological fall-out attendant upon the
establishment of unwanted genetic ties, Justice Friedmann would
64
constrict the context in which embryo implantation could occur.
This line of reasoning would require the spouse seeking embryo
implantation to demonstrate the impossibility of achieving
65
parenthood through additional IVF attempts or adoption. “Mere
discomfort, expense, or other potentially surmountable difficulties
should not suffice to defeat the . . . fundamental right to avoid
66
biological fatherhood.” According to Justice Friedmann, unwanted
67
genetic links are an ill to be avoided at virtually all costs.
Dissenting Justices Miller and Altman disagreed. In an analysis that
commentators have largely ignored, these justices took issue with
Justice Friedmann’s ready assumption that the right to avoid
procreation should, in most cases, be upheld. Eschewing
generalization, they argued for a more individualized assessment of
68
the parties before the court.
Rather than tilt the balancing of
63. Id. at 592-93 (quoting John A. Robertson, Reproductive Technology and
Reproductive Rights: In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV.
437, 523 (1990)).
64. See id. at 592 (“It is the irrevocability of parenthood that is most crushing to
the unconsenting gamete provider; and it is principally because of this that I find it
hard to imagine a situation where a court should undertake to foist parenthood
upon an unwilling individual.”).
65. See id. at 593 (arguing that, in Mrs. Kass’s case, she failed to establish that she
lacked reasonable alternative means of achieving parenthood). Her testimony “that
she has a medical condition that makes it difficult for her to conceive and carry a
child to term, and that as an unmarried person in her late 30s she would not find it
easy to recommence the IVF process” was not, according to that Justice, persuasive.
Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. (arguing that unwanted genetic links could later lead to problems for
the party who sought to avoid procreation, where, for example, places like New York
have imposed a duty upon biological parents to support their children regardless of
how they were conceived).
68. See id. at 599-600 (Miller, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should analyze
each case by using a “fact-sensitive” approach, which considers the positions of the
parties and the various burdens placed on the parties depending on the disposition
of the preembryo).
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procreational rights in favor of the negative right to avoid genetic
links, the dissenters suggested that the proper inquiry was “whether
the burdens of unwanted paternity to the ‘would-not-be-father’
exceed the deprivation of a possibly last opportunity for maternity to
69
the ‘would-be-mother.’”
When considering the burdens of forced paternity, the dissent
noted that the injustice of imposing financial responsibility on
parents who sought to prevent the child’s birth could be removed
through legislation. Legislators could relieve objecting spouses of
their concern over financial liability by simply treating objecting
70
spouses as nothing more than sperm donors.
In their analysis of the possible psychological impact, Justices Miller
and Altman set themselves apart by rejecting the assumption that
71
forced parenthood necessarily heralds psychological devastation.
While acknowledging that, for some, the presence of biological
children might inspire strong desires for attachment—which might
lead to bitter custody and visitation fights—the justices also suggested
that not all biological parents feel an atavistic pull to succor their
72
young. Instead, they suggested that, for some, the psychological
73
The
impact of bringing their embryos to term would be slight.
dissenting justices argued that a close scrutiny of the objecting
spouse’s circumstances and motivations was necessary to determine
the true magnitude of unwanted parenthood in any particular
74
instance.
Unfortunately, courts in future cases ignored these
admonitions, shifted away from individualized assessments, and
moved toward a bright-line rule that recognizes the right to avoid
procreation as the dominant value in these disputes.

69. Id. at 600.
70. The Kass court noted that “[w]hile commentators may debate the advisability
of permitting the abrogation of customary support obligations in nontraditional
family settings . . . [a] strong case can be made for legislation relieving the objectant
of unwanted parenthood by treating him as a sperm donor in cases such as this.” Id.
71. See id. at 601 (Miller, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are undeniably numerous men
who callously and thoughtlessly father children without any concern for their
offspring. For such a man the psychological and emotional impacts of unwanted
fatherhood would be less severe or even nonexistent.”).
72. See id. (noting that “objections to involuntary procreation should not be
lightly cast aside”).
73. See id. (adding that the only moral and psychological burden placed on some
fathers may be the mere knowledge that he has a child somewhere in the world living
without his presence).
74. See id. at 602 (advocating an approach that considers the unique nature of
each individual case).
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D. A.Z. v. B.Z. and J.B. v. M.B.
75

The Massachusetts Supreme Court in A.Z. v. B.Z. and the New
76
Jersey Supreme Court in J.B. v. M.B. also encountered frozen
embryo disputes involving couples who entered into dispositional
77
agreements prior to embarking on fertility treatment. In both cases,
the dispositional agreements stated that, in the event of divorce, the
78
embryos would be implanted and brought to term. Faced with the
fact that these agreements, if enforced, could have possibly led to the
birth of children over the objections of one gamete donor, both
courts refused enforcement on the grounds that the agreements
79
violated public policy.
Both the Massachusetts Supreme Court and the New Jersey
Supreme Court “discovered” in their state precedents a policy against
80
enforcing agreements that could create unwanted family ties. Both
courts mentioned legislative and judicial reluctance to bind birth
mothers to surrogacy contracts or to adoption agreements that they
81
could later disavow. These courts also noted judicial distaste for
legal claims that seek to hold indiviudals to their earlier decisions to
82
marry, conceive, or abort. This aversion to interfering “in intimate
83
questions inherent in the marriage relationship” was interpreted by
75. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
76. 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
77. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 710 (stating that the couple signed a consent form, which
described that any unused preembryos would be implanted in the wife or donated to
infertile couples); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1053 (explaining that the couple was required
to sign a preprinted consent form at the IVF clinic determining the disposition of the
preembryos).
78. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 710 (stating that the IVF clinic required such consent
forms before undergoing treatment); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054 (describing the
consent form signed by both husband and wife, which stated that upon separation,
the preembryos would be returned to the wife for implementation).
79. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 718-19 (explaining that public policy permits an
individual to object to a contract that would determine family relationships); A.Z.,
725 N.E.2d at 1057-58 (noting that the freedom to contract may be outweighed by
public policy against forced procreation).
80. See A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1059 (stating that liberty and privacy rights include the
freedom to choose whether to enter into family relationships); J.B., 783 A.2d at 71819 (noting that the Massachusetts Supreme Court has held that enforcing a contract
compelling procreation over the will of an objecting party contravenes public policy
despite the persuasive arguments in support of enforcement).
81. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 717 (citing various cases which held that compelled
parenthood is unenforceable); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058 (explaining relevant
legislation that outlaws the enforcement of contracts that bind individuals into
familial relationships).
82. See J.B., 783 A.2d at 719 (holding that the contracts are “subject to the right
of either party to change his or her mind about [the] disposition” concerning the
use or destruction of the preembryos); A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058-59 (stating that
individuals are entitled later to change their minds about important familial
decisions).
83. A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058.
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both courts to reveal a broad policy against compelling individuals to
84
enter into intimate family relationships.
In J.B., the New Jersey Supreme Court followed the Davis court
presumption when it ruled in favor of the party seeking to avoid
85
procreation. Though the husband sought to donate the embryos to
an infertile couple who would presumably accept full financial and
social responsibility, the court nonetheless was deeply concerned with
the impact on the wife.
The court commented that the
“[i]mplantation, if successful, would result in the birth of her
biological child and could have life-long emotional and psychological
86
repercussions.” Economics aside, the courts in both cases held that
divorcing spouses who object to the use of the frozen embryos they
created should enjoy permanent veto power over the embryo
implantation because “genetic ties may form a powerful bond . . .
even if the progenitor is freed from the legal obligations of
87
parenthood.”
Court attitudes in these cases seem to be influenced by a unique
88
strand of genetic determinism. According to this notion, parental
89
identity and rights flow directly from genetic ties. When it comes to
the emotional bonds inspired by parenthood, courts assume that
90
biology dictates psychology. However, just as the biogenetic law,
which states that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” failed to
91
withstand scientific scrutiny, this judicial assumption cannot bear
the weight of a sustained examination. The data, amassed both by
experts in family formation and dissolution and by those studying the
psycho-social effects of sperm donation, suggests that psychological

84. J.B., 783 A.2d at 717; A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1058-59.
85. J.B., 783 A.2d at 716.
86. Id. at 717.
87. Id. (quoting Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human Preembryo, the
Progenitors, and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, and Research Policy, 5
HIGH TECH. L.J. 257, 290 (1990)).
88. See Robert D. Stone, The Cloudy Crystal Ball: Genetics, Child Abuse, and the Perils
of Predicting Behavior, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1557, 1563-64 (2003) (noting that genetic
determinism has gained prominence through movies as well as through political and
scientific literature).
89. See id. at 1564 (explaining how some observers feel that genetic determinism
can be morphed into eugenics or other nefarious types of genetic discrimination).
90. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW
WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 51-61 (1999).
91. While numerous connections exist between ontogeny, the development of
the embryos of a given species, and phylogeny, the evolutionary history of a species,
the theory, which states that an organism’s growth from an embryo onward mirrors
the evolutionary development of that species, has been largely discredited. STEPHEN
J. GOULD, ONTOGENY & PHYLOGENY 8, 206 (1977).
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and social parenthood is a much more complex, tenuous, and
92
malleable affair then most courts are willing to acknowledge.
The first section of the following part examines the social science
literature on parental disengagement and argues that biological links
are not predictive of psychological attachment. Buttressing this
conclusion, the second section addresses the research devoted to the
psycho-social dimensions of sperm donation, which indicates that a
majority of donors have no enduring feeling or concern for the
children whose existence they help conceive.
II. UNCOUPLING BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENTHOOD:
WHAT THE DATA REVEALS
A. Data on Disappearing Dads
Dramatic changes in the basic configuration of the family have lent
new urgency to the study of parent-child relations. Divorce rates
93
remain steady at roughly 50% while non-marital childbearing
94
With the two-parent family in retreat on
continues to increase.
95
multiple fronts, researchers are examining the effects of singleparent child-rearing on the economic and psychological well-being of
96
children. Because existing data suggests that children who remain
92. See infra Part II.
93. Michael E. Lamb, Nonresidential Fathers and Their Children, in HANDBOOK OF
FATHER INVOLVEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 169, 169 (Catherine S.
Tamis-LeMonda & Natasha Cabrera eds., 2002).
94. Marcia J. Carlson & Sarah S. McLanahan, Fragile Families, Father Involvement
and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES 461, 461 (Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda & Natasha Cabrera eds., 2002);
see also Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current Status of Divorce in the United States,
4 CHILD. & DIVORCE 29, 32 (1994) [hereinafter Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current
Status] (noting that the overall number of nonmarital births has risen nearly six
times,
from
5%
in
1960
to
28%
in
1990),
available
at
http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr doc/vol4no1ART3.pdf; Stephanie J. Ventura
& Christine A. Bachrach, Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States, 1940-99, 48 NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 6 (2000) (reporting that nonmarital birthrates for black women
rose from 56% in 1980 to 69% in 1999 and that nonmarital birth rates for white
women rose from 9% in 1980 to 22% in 1999, while nonmarital birth rates for
Hispanic women rose from 24% in 1980 to 42% in 1999), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs /data/nvsr/nvsr48/nvs 4816.pdf.
95. See Gunnar Andersson, Children’s Experience of Family Disruption and Family
Formation: Evidence from 16 FFS Countries, 7 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 343, 354 (2002)
(estimating that between 50% and 54% of all children will spend some portion of
their childhood in a single-parent household), available at http://www.demographicresearch.org.
96. See generally Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Kathleen Mullan Harris, The
Disappearing American Father? Divorce and the Waning Significance of Biological
Parenthood, in THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY: SOCIOLOGICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC
PERSPECTIVES 197, 214 (Scott J. South & Stewart E. Tolnay eds., 1992) (arguing that
the child/father relationship is unpredictable and that it declines over the years,
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in close and continual contact with both parents fare better on
97
measures ranging from emotional health to academic performance,
researchers have begun to examine the reasons why families, both
marital and non-marital, dissolve and why, in the wake of that
dissolution, nonresident parents tend to disengage from their
children.
While the data tells a complex story, one fact is clear. Parental or,
98
at least, paternal attachment is not biologically rooted. Rather, the
degree to which a parent forms deep and enduring ties with a
99
biological child is contingent on a number of variables. Residential
proximity, the relationship with the other parent, cultural and
familial expectations and individual maturity all play a role.
1.

Factors contributing to parental disengagement
a.

Cohabitation and proximity
100

An examination of parent-child involvement
suggests that
absence does not make the heart grow fonder. When parents move
especially when the father moves out when the child is very young).
97. See Paul R. Amato, The Consequences of Divorce For Adults and Children, 62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1269, 1282 (2000) (noting that adults and children from broken
homes score lower on a variety of “indicators of well-being”).
98. While this paper argues that parental attachment—for both men and
women—is socially constructed rather than biologically determined, the data and
conclusions discussed herein relate largely to fathers and not to mothers. This is so
because in both post-divorce and nonmarital situations, the overwhelming numbers
of children live with their mothers. See Sandra L. Hofferth et al., The Demography of
Fathers, in HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 63,
65 (Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda & Natasha Cabrera eds., 2002) (reporting that data
collected in 1996 reveals that 23% of the children surveyed lived exclusively with
their biological mother, while only 2% lived exclusively with their biological father).
Consequently, the problem of nonresidential parent detachment is essentially a
problem of detaching fathers. Research devoted to understanding this process of
disengagement thus focuses on fathers. But see Susan D. Stewart, Nonresident Mothers’
and Fathers’ Social Contact with Children, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 894, 899-900 (1999)
(finding that where the mother is the nonresident parent, mothers exhibit higher
levels of telephone and letter contact and extended visitation). While the process of
gestation may create ties that men do not enjoy with their children, I would still
argue that parenthood is largely a socially driven phenomenon for women as well as
for men. However, social forces combine to universally support the mothering role
for women, while these forces serve as both spur and impediment to men’s
assumption of the father role.
99. See ROSS D. PARKE, FATHERHOOD 77 (1996) (pointing out that fathers do not
simply decide to be involved or noninvolved but are influenced by factors ranging
from attitudes, beliefs and motivations of the father to family, extrafamilial and
cultural influences).
100. Parental involvement depends upon many factors. Studies have recorded
factors such as geographic mobility, remarriage of either parent, inability to establish
a workable childrearing arrangement with the former spouse, lack of access due to
actions of the former spouse, and psychological pain at not being able to see their
children in the same manner as before. A convergence of these factors may cause
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out of their children’s residences, parent-child relationships are likely
101
In one study of divorce, 20% of nonresident fathers
to erode.
reported that they had not seen a biological child at all in the past
102
year, while another 8% reported visiting only once.
Data from
another examination of post-divorce interactions between nonresident dads and their children disclosed that nearly one-half of the
children studied between the ages of 11 to 16 had not seen their
103
father in the last twelve months. A recent national study assessing
the strength and durability of “Fragile Families,” which encompassed
children and their never-married parents, revealed that 40% of
nonresident fathers are uninvolved with their one-year-old biological
104
children.
Empirical investigation also reveals that the erosion of parental ties
is directly related to the length of time that parents and children live
105
apart.
This pattern persists in both divorce and non-marital
situations. In one study concerning children of divorce, children
were interviewed about their contacts with nonresidential parents at
106
various intervals following the parents’ separation.
When asked
whether they saw their nonresident father in a typical month, 31% of
fathers to remove themselves entirely from their children’s’ lives. Studies have also
found that fathers are more likely to stay involved in their children’s lives if the
relationship with their ex-spouse is good, if they are employed, and if they had been
highly involved in their child’s life in the past. See Christine Winquist Nord &
Nicholas Zill, Non-Custodial Parent’s Participation in their Children’s Lives: Evidence from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (Aug. 14, 1996), available at
http://www.fatherhood.hhs.gov/SIPP/pt2.htm
101. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital
Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 656, 663-64 (1983).
102. Judith Seltzer & Yvonne Brandreth, What Fathers Say About Involvement With
Children After Separation, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 49, 60 (1994).
103. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Good Dads—Bad Dads: Two Faces of Fatherhood, in
THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 202-03 (A.J. Cherlin ed.,
1988); see A. McMurray & A.M. Blackmore, Influences on Parent-Child Relationships in
Non-Custodial Fathers, 14 AUSTL. J. MARRIAGE & FAM. (1992) (reporting the results of a
West Australian study revealing that 38% of separated fathers had less than monthly
contact with their children), available at http://users.tpg.com.au/users/resolve/ncp
report/mcm&b(1993).html.
104. SARAH MCLANAHAN ET AL., PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, FRAGILE
FAMILIES ONE YEAR LATER:
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 13 (2002), available at
http://ppic.org/content/pubs/OP_1002SMOP.pdf.
105. See Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships between Fathers and Children Who Live Apart:
The Father’s Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 90-92 (1991)
(documenting and finding that fathers’ involvement with children born within
marriage declines as the time since separation increases). In data collected from the
1987-1988 National Survey of Families and Households, the numbers of fathers who
saw their children once or not at all rose from roughly 13% in the first two years of
separation to over 50% when the fathers had been separated from their children for
eleven years or longer. Id.
106. Frank Furstenberg, Jr. & Christine Winquist Nord, Parenting Apart: Patterns of
Childrearing After Marital Disruption, 47 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 893 (1985).
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those children whose parents had been separated less than two years
107
answered in the negative. At five years post-separation, the number
rose to 55% and, at ten years post-separation, nearly 75% of those
children interviewed stated that they did not see their nonresidential
108
parent in a typical month. In that same study, when children were
interviewed within two years of their parents’ separation, 74%
indicated that they had seen their nonresident parent within the last
109
thirty days.
That number fell to 28% when the children were
110
Indeed, when the
interviewed ten or more years post-divorce.
parents had been separated for ten or more years, nearly one-half of
the children interviewed had not seen their nonresidential parent in
111
more than five years.
There are several reasons for this trend. One theme that emerges
from qualitative studies of non-custodial divorced fathers is the
dislocation men feel when they lose touch with the rhythms of their
112
children’s lives.
The routines established when living under one
roof are disrupted when the couple separates. Fathers feel more like
113
They are
visiting uncles and are challenged by this role-shift.
unsure how to accommodate to their new role and, for many, feel
114
more comfortable simply disappearing.
In the case of nevermarried dads, many of these individuals never forge the bonds that
115
would keep them attached and interested in their child’s life.
107. Id. at 895.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See EDWARD KRUK, DIVORCE AND DISENGAGEMENT: PATTERNS OF FATHERHOOD
WITHIN AND BEYOND MARRIAGE 42-44 (1993) (identifying the “perceived role loss” as a
major contributing factor to paternal disengagement).
113. Id. at 46 (noting that “[f]athers identified a variety of constraints in ‘visiting,’
with the greatest number describing the avuncular nature of the relationship and the
fact that ‘visiting’ in no way constituted ‘real fatherhood’”); see Frank F. Furstenberg,
Jr., The Disappearing American Father, in THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY:
SOCIOLOGICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVES 197, 216 (Scott J. South & Stewart E.
Tolnay eds., 1992) [hereinafter Furstenberg, Jr., Disappearing American Father]
(reporting that nonresidential fathers are more likely to fade into a secondary role
when faced with parenting apart).
114. See KRUK, supra note 113, at 47; Lamb, supra note 93, at 177-78 (discussing the
theory that men “drift away from their children after divorce because they are
deprived of the opportunity to be parents rather than visitors”); Edward Kruk,
Psychological and Structural Factors Contributing to the Disengagement of Noncustodial
Fathers After Divorce, 30 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 81, 98 (1992).
115. See Judith A. Seltzer et al., Family Ties After Divorce: The Relationship Between
Visiting and Paying Child Support, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1013, 1028 (1989). Seltzer
stated that:
[s]hared experiences provide the foundation for common understandings
about family obligations and norms of reciprocity in exchanges between kin.
. . . For non-custodial parents and minor children, however, developing
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Often, the child is perceived merely as a burden and as a friction
116
This research
point in the adult relationship with the mother.
suggests that psychological attachment is borne from day-to-day
experience and interactions rather than from blood or kinship lines.
b.

The relationship with the other parent

Residential status aside, the second most important determinant of
father involvement is the father’s relationship with the child’s
mother. Fathers who continue romantic relationships with the
child’s mother tend to remain involved with the child. If the
relationship cools or becomes hostile, the relationship with the child
117
often wanes.
In one study of paternal involvement during
pregnancy and birth, the strength of the adult couple relationship
was highly determinative of the father’s involvement in the pregnancy
and birth. The romantically involved cohabiting fathers were nearly
seventeen times more likely to provide financial support to the
pregnant mothers than the non-romantically involved nonresident
118
fathers. In another study, those fathers who reported no romantic
relationship with the mother of their child were 67% less likely to be
119
involved with their children than the romantically linked fathers.
commitment is a more precarious undertaking. The relationship has had
less opportunity to develop; it depends on children’s age and developmental
stage, the parents’ relationship with each other, and . . . many intervening
events that change parents’ and children’s lives after a divorce.
Id.
116. See id. at 1013 (arguing that noncustodial fathers’ involvement with a child
decreases some of the negative effects children suffer because of their living with a
single mother).
117. Rebekah Levine Coley & P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Father’s Involvement with
Their Children Over Time, POVERTY RES. NEWSL. (Northwestern Univ./Univ. of
Chicago/Joint Center for Poverty Research, Ill.), Mar.-Apr. 2000, available at
http://www.jcpr.org.newsletters/vol4_no2/articles2.htm; see Marcia Carlson & Sarah
McLanahan, Characteristics and Antecedents of Involvement by Young, Unmarried Fathers 20
(Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 02-09-FF, 2002). Carlson
and McLanahan report that in a study of father involvement among unmarried
fathers:
[t]he relationship between the parents appears to have important
implications for father’s involvement with their children at one year, even
controlling for their initial involvement level. When the father reports that
the mother is supportive in their relationship he is much more likely to be
frequently involved in the child’s life. Also, the father’s believing that
marriage is very likely is strongly related to his involvement with his one-yearold child.
Id.
118. Waldo E. Johnson, Jr., Paternal Involvement Among Unwed Fathers, 23 CHILD. &
YOUTH SERV. REV. 513, 523, 528 (2001) [hereinafter Johnson, Jr., Paternal
Involvement].
119. Gina R. Hijjawi et al., An Exploratory Analysis of Father Involvement in Low-Income
Families 22 (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing, Working Paper No. 03-01-FF,
2003).
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This is a common pattern when assessing the characteristics of
120
involved and uninvolved nonresident fathers.
Researchers seeking to explain the reason why paternal-maternal
relations play such a prominent role in post-divorce or non-marital
parent-child relations have encountered two types of explanations—
121
“his” and “hers.” When disengaged fathers are questioned as to why
they detach from their children, they frequently point to the
122
mother’s role as the parsimonious gatekeeper. According to these
fathers, mothers express anger toward the father by denying access to
123
the child.
In a variation on the theme, mothers vent their
disappointment in the father to the child, which creates an arid
124
Mothers, in turn,
environment for paternal-child relations.
complain that once the romantic relationship ends, fathers revert to
more selfish habits that supplant their earlier commitments to
125
provide emotionally or financially for their children.
While not specifically identified by mothers or fathers, researchers
speculate that paternal-child bonds develop when fathers involve
themselves in the family unit to enjoy the warmth and the attention
126
of a romantic partner, namely, the baby’s mother.
When the
incentives of adult companionship and support are absent, the allure
127
of the parent-child bond is often insufficient to sustain attachment.
120. Carlson & McLanahan, supra note 94, at 474.
121. See Nora Cate Shaeffer et al., Methodological and Theoretical Issues in Studying
Nonresident Fathers: A Selective Review 2, 4 (Nat’l Ctr. on Fathers & Families, Working
Paper) (reporting that mothers and fathers differ in reporting the amounts of child
support paid and received).
122. See KRUK, supra note 113, at 71-73 (reporting that fathers feel that mothers
simply do not want them around); see also MAUREEN R. WALLER, MY BABY’S FATHER:
UNMARRIED PARENTS AND PATERNAL RESPONSIBILITY 81 (2002) (noting a “culture of
distrust” that permeates a separated or divorced couple). See generally TERRY
ARENDELL, FATHERS & DIVORCE 81 (1995) (observing that fathers often feel that
women gain “disproportionate authority” over the children after a divorce).
123. See ARENDELL, supra note 123, at 146-48 (opining that dissension between
parents could cause the father to withdraw completely from the child’s life due to
frustration with the mother); KRUK, supra note 113, at 90 (reporting “access
difficulties” as the primary reason for post-divorce parental disengagement); WALLER,
supra note 123, at 88-90 (quoting one father who stated that the mother of his child
wanted “to ‘get back at him’”).
124. WALLER, supra note 123, at 88-89.
125. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Fathering in the Inner City: Paternal Participation and
Public Policy, in FATHERHOOD: CONTEMPORARY THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY
119, 136 (William Marsiglio ed., 1995) [hereinafter Furstenberg, Jr., Fathering in the
Inner City] (stating that “[w]omen who see men spend on themselves, their friends
(new girlfriends in particular), and even other family members (including other
children) resent the absence of support offered to them and their children”).
126. CAROL A. HEIMER & LISA R. STAFFEN, FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILDREN: THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE HOSPITAL AND THE HOME 307 (1998).
127. See CARLSON & MCLANAHAN, supra note 117, at 5 (stating that “if the motherfather relationship is negative or hostile, interacting with the mother may be painful
for the father, and he may withdraw from the child in order to avoid interacting with
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New relationships and commitments

The formation of new relationships and, in turn, new obligations
and commitments is associated statistically with a lessened
involvement with a parent’s biological children from previous
128
relationships.
For more than 50% of the population, life-long
129
partnering has been replaced with serial coupling. In addition, the
sequential nature of adult intimacy has, for many, led to the new
130
phenomenon of serial parenting. This trend is particularly true for
131
divorced or never-married fathers. For serial parents, involvement
with biological children extends throughout the duration of the adult
132
When that relationship ends and another begins,
relationship.
these parents transfer their attentions to the children present in the
133
new household.
Serial parenthood is particularly likely when the
the mother”); see also Furstenberg, Jr., Fathering in the Inner City, supra note 125, at 137
(arguing that “[a] man’s allegiance to his children is maintained in part by the bond
established with his children’s mother [and that] when that bond dissolves, men
sometimes have difficulty establishing a direct relationship with their children”);
Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current Status, supra note 94, at 36. Furstenberg stated
that:
[a]t the heart of the problem is that many regard parenthood as part of a
“package deal” that is inextricably linked with marriage or a marriage-like
relationship. Men, in particular, often relate to their children in large part
through their wives or partners. The disintegration of that relationship
reduces noncustodial parents’ willingness to invest resources in their
children. This is especially so after remarriage, when parents often feel
supplanted and disadvantaged by a new figure.
Id.
128. Judith A. Seltzer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Children’s Contact with Absent Parents,
50 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 3, 663, 674 (1988) (noting that biological parents have less
contact with children who live with legally or socially defined substitute parents). See
also Patrick McKenry et al., Nonresidential Father Involvement: A Comparison of Divorced,
Separated, Never Married, and Remarried Fathers, 25 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1, 9
(1996) (demonstrating that re-married dads visit their biological children less than
divorced or separated dads).
129. Id. at 674.
130. See id. (noting that data from a study accords with the interpretation that
“high rates of divorce and remarriage” create conditions for “serial parenthood”); see
also Elizabeth C. Cooksey & Patricia H. Craig, Parenting from a Distance: The Effects of
Paternal Characteristics on Contact Between Nonresidential Fathers and Their Children, 35
DEMOGRAPHY 187, 198 (1998) (“[S]erial parenting is becoming the norm for some
men as links to their children begin and end in conjunction with the marriages or
[the] relationships they have with the child’s mother.”).
131. Cooksey & Craig, supra note 130, at 198.
132. Seltzer & Bianchi, supra note 128, at 674.
133. See id. (noting that data is consistent with the notion “that noncustodial
parents discard ties to their biological children with divorce, and the ties are
replaced through remarriage”); see also Robert Lerman & Elaine Sorensen, Father
Involvement with Their Nonmarital Children: Patterns, Determinants, and Effects on Their
Earnings, 29 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 143, 145 (2000) (reporting results of a
longitudinal study that showed that of the 32% of unmarried, nonresidential fathers
who were not visiting their child(ren) weekly, roughly one-half “were married to
someone other than the biological mother of their nonmarital child and two-thirds
had a subsequent marital birth”); see, e.g., Furstenberg, Jr., Disappearing American
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children in the new household are biologically related to the serial
134
parent.
d.

Other factors influencing father involvement

Paternal involvement is also influenced by the norms and signals
135
transmitted by the family of origin. The family of origin molds and
transmits parental identity implicitly, through modeling and
136
A young
examples, and explicitly, through counsel and advice.
male who has grown up in a fatherless household is more likely to
procreate and then to disengage than a male who has grown up with
137
the steady presence of a father.
Additionally, another family
member’s response to the news of a pregnancy or a birth may have a
138
large impact on the parenting behavior that follows.
Father, supra note 113, at 217 (asserting that “[s]ome men who become stepparents
or surrogate parents in a new household often transfer their loyalties to their new
family. Relations with their biological children become largely symbolic if they
survive at all.”).
134. Cooksey & Craig, supra note 130, at 198 (stating that “[s]pecifically, it is when
fathers are currently living in traditional nuclear family setting—that is, when they
reside with only biological children and not in new ‘blended’ families—that they are
less likely to see their children from former relationships”). Dr. Furstenberg, an
expert on fatherhood, has explored the attitudes and behaviors of young,
economically disadvantaged fathers. He discovered that these fathers often have
multiple children with different partners, and become overwhelmed by the varied
and conflicting social and economic obligations owed to each mother-child unit.
With no clear sense of how their meager material resources should be divided, these
men spread their resources and energies sporadically and inconsistently. They
engage in what Dr. Furstenberg terms “selective attention” as a way of coping with a
multitude of needs they can’t possibly meet. They “may be doing for some children
and not for others. They may be neglecting their biological children while being a
daddy to someone’s (sic) elses child.” Furstenberg, Jr., Fathering in the Inner City,
supra note 125, at 140. As the juggling act becomes increasingly untenable, the men
simply withdraw—limiting their attentions to the children with whom they live and
abandoning the children from prior liaisons. “Relatively weak attachments to prior
relationships often lead men to invest disproportionately in current families
relinquishing ties to children from earlier unions.” Id.
135. See Waldo E. Johnson, Jr., Young Unwed African American Fathers: Indicators of
Their Paternal Involvement, in FORGING LINKS: AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN CLINICAL
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 147, 155-57 (Angela M. Neal-Barnett et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter Johnson, Jr., Young Unwed African American Fathers].
136. See Johnson, Jr., Paternal Involvement, supra note 118, at 517 (“Parental identity
and parenting development is primarily a compilation of experiences and
observations over time. . . . The family of origin provides the cultural script in which
many of these experiences and observations are acquired.”).
137. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. & Christopher C. Weiss, Intergenerational
Transmission of Fathering Roles in At Risk Families, 29 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 181, 196
(2000).
138. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE
MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 159, 162 (1999) (describing the important role of
older adults in encouraging younger men to assume the parental role); see also
Johnson, Jr., Young Unwed African American Fathers, supra note 135, at 156 (telling the
story of a young man who was poised to deny paternity until his mother and
grandmother visited the hospital, pointed out a family resemblance and announced,
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Limitations of the data to frozen embryo disputes

Not all of the data documenting the “disappearing dad”
phenomena applies directly to frozen embryo disputes. Some of the
previously cited studies indicate that father disengagement is most
139
common among black men living on the poverty line. The litigants
in the frozen embryo disputes are typically white, financially
comfortable professionals, socialized according to norms that vary
140
quite dramatically from the “code of the street.”
Nevertheless,
studies focusing on absent fathers whose profiles more closely
resemble those of frozen embryo disputants do exist and they tell a
similar story. Paternal self-concept is not biologically driven, but
rather, socially enacted. The self-concept is strong when a propitious
“‘[y]ou are going to take care of that baby [since i]t’s your responsibility’”); see, e.g.,
Angela Dungee Greene & Kristin Anderson Moore, Nonresident Father Involvement and
Child Well-Being Among Young Children in Families on Welfare, 29 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV.
159, 175 (2000) (noting that father involvement is “more likely among those fathers
whose family members also provide support for the child, such as clothes, toys, and
child care. . . . [T]he direction or causation is unknown; however, . . . in many cases,
the father’s family assists in the care and support of the child and encourages the
father to remain involved.”).
139. See Furstenberg, Jr., Fathering in the Inner City, supra note 125, at 136;
ANDERSON, supra note 138, at 182 (explaining that in the case of many black fathers,
their parental role has recently been challenged by changes in the nation’s economy
and job market); Rebekah Levine Coley & P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Stability and
Change in Paternal Involvement Among Urban African American Fathers, 13 J. FAM.
PSYCHOL. 416, 417-19 (1999) (detailing that males who have both occupations and
schooling tend to be more involved fathers); Waldo E. Johnson, Jr., Work Preparation
and Labor Market Experiences Among Urban, Poor, Nonresident Fathers, in COPING WITH
POVERTY: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF NEIGHBORHOOD, WORK, AND FAMILY IN THE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY 224, 226-27 (Sheldon Danziger & Ann Chih Lin eds.,
2003) (arguing that more jobs must become available if there is to be any hope of
improving men’s “parenting roles”); Waldo E. Johnson, Jr., Paternal Involvement in
Fragile, African American Families: Implications For Clinical Social Work Practice, 68 SMITH
C. STUD. SOC. WORK 215, 215 (1998) (indicating that African-American fathers who
are poor and who come from “fragile” families are most susceptible to parental
disengagement); Johnson, Jr., Young Unwed American Fathers, supra note 135, at 154
(noting that a male who does not attain the “developmental tasks of adolescence”
will be unlikely to “transition” smoothly into fatherhood); Jane Mosley & Elizabeth
Thomson, Fathering Behavior and Child Outcomes: The Role of Race and Poverty, in
FATHERHOOD: CONTEMPORARY THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL POLICY 148, 148-65 (W.
Marsiglio ed., 1995) (exploring the effects of race and poverty on parent
involvement); Robin L. Jarrett et al., Fathers in the “Hood”: Insights From Qualitative
Research on Low-Income African-American Men, in THE HANDBOOK OF FATHER
INVOLVEMENT (Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda & Natasha Cabrera eds., 2002) 233
(concluding that for many African American fathers in low-income communities,
“fatherhood is a dynamic process, characterized by periods of involvement and
absence.”); Timothy J. Nelson et al., Sustaining Fragile Fatherhood: Father Involvement
Among Low-Income, Noncustodial African-American Fathers in Philadelphia, in THE
HANDBOOK OF FATHER INVOLVEMENT 525 (Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda & Natasha
Cabrera eds., 2002) (noting that many low-income fathers have difficulty fulfilling
their roles as fathers).
140. See ANDERSON, supra note 138, at 180-83 (explaining the social norms and
pressures facing black fathers in the inner-city).

WALDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

10/3/2004 5:35 PM

THE PARENT TRAP

1049

set of social conditions converge to support it, and it is weak under a
varying set of conditions. The next section discusses another body of
data drawn from studies of sperm donors that further challenges the
assumption that genetic links herald life-long emotional attachments.
B. More Uncoupling—Data from Sperm Donors
1.

Sperm donor attitudes toward offspring
Artificial insemination using donor sperm has been practiced
141
commercially for at least thirty years. More recently, concern about
anonymity and sperm-donor motivation has prompted empirical
inquiries into the attitudes and the preferences of those who chose to
donate sperm. These studies, which delve into the psycho-social
ramifications of sperm donation, suggest that most sperm donors are
relatively unconcerned with the offspring their semen creates.
One study designed to evaluate donors’ motivations and attitudes
toward donation asked the following series of questions: Why did you
decide to become a sperm donor? Would you like to be informed if
use of your semen results in pregnancy? Would you like to meet the
offspring when it has become an adult person? If you had the
opportunity, would you like to leave a message to your potential
142
offspring?
In explaining motive, 32% of the respondents stated
that their interests in donating were purely financial, 8% stated their
interests were purely altruistic, and the remaining 60% indicated that
143
they were motivated by a combination of the two interests. Eighty
percent of those surveyed stated that they did not want to be
informed of any pregnancies resulting from use of their semen and
88% stated they would not be interested in meeting the offspring
144
conceived through their donation.
None of the donors surveyed
145
were interested in leaving any message to their potential offspring.
Consonant with their desire to remain detached, 60% of the donors
surveyed stated that they would cease donating if the offspring could

141. Idant Laboratories Division, located in Manhattan, has been in existence
since 1971, while the California Cryo bank was founded in 1977.
IDANT
LABORATORIES, available at http://www.idant.com (last visited June 29, 2004);
CALIFORNIA CRYOBANK SPERM BANK, available at http://cryobank.com (last visited June
29, 2004).
142. Bjorn Pedersen et al., Psychosocial Aspects of Donor Insemination: Sperm Donors—
Their Motivations and Attitudes to Artificial Insemination, 73 ACTA. OBSTET. GYNECOL.
SCAND. 701, 702 (1994).
143. Id. at 703.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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146

ascertain their identity later in life. In a masterful understatement,
the authors of this study concluded that, for this set of donors,
“offspring seem not to be felt as ‘family’ with whom donors
147
can/should be emotionally involved.”
This disinterest in potential offspring is apparent in the results
148
obtained from other studies. In one study of donor attitudes in the
United Kingdom, only 48% of the donors surveyed stated that they
wanted to know if any children had been born as a result of their
149
donation. This proportion shrank to 34% when asked whether they
would like to receive basic information about any offspring such as
150
the sex and the date of birth. Less than 20% expressed a desire to
have further details of potential offspring and less than 15%
151
expressed an interest in having contact with them.
When asked if
they would continue donating if they could be identified, 63%
152
answered in the negative.
Donors in the United States responded similarly when questioned
153
about their attitudes toward donor offspring. Nearly 71% of those
154
questioned stated that donating sperm was like donating blood.
Only 12% would advocate changing the current practice to allow
155
offspring contact with their genetic donor. While non-donors were
inclined to think that donation was an altruistic act, the donors
themselves largely disagreed with that characterization and stressed
the large role that financial compensation played in their interest in
156
donation.

146. Id. at 703.
147. Id. at 704.
148. See Rachel Cook & Susan Golombok, A Survey of Semen Donation: Phase II—The
View of Donors, 10 HUM. REP. 951, 954 (1995) (reporting low interest of sperm donors
in offspring); see also Mark Sauer et al., Attitudinal Survey of Sperm Donors to an Artificial
Insemination Clinic, 34 J. REPROD. MED. 362, 363 (1989) (noting the importance of
remuneration in sperm-donor motivation).
149. Cook & Golombok, supra note 148, at 954.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 957.
153. See Sauer et al., supra note 148, at 363 (reporting that, because they wanted to
remain anonymous, most donors surveyed were against a national registry).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id. (noting that, while 61% of the control group of non-donors stated that
donors are altruistic, only 12% of the donors themselves agreed with that
characterization and also noting that, when questioned whether they would continue
to donate if money were withheld, only 31% of those queried said yes, thereby
demarcating the limits of their philanthropy). Semen providers canvassed elsewhere
have expressed other sentiments. See A. Lalos et al., Recruitment and Motivation of
Semen Providers in Sweden, 18 HUM. REP. 212, 213 (2003) (reporting that 70% of
Swedish sperm donors reported that they donated to help infertile couples).
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Emotional distance was also salient in the responses of sperm
donors tallied in another paper. A review paper analyzing data from
multiple studies of sperm donor attitudes revealed reluctance on the
part of donors to view offspring as anything other than “other
157
people’s children.” A tabulation of the data from eleven studies of
semen providers from four different countries showed that less than
one-half of those queried were willing to make contact with future
158
offspring created from their donated DNA. Older, married donors
were more open to future contact with their offspring than were the
159
younger donors. Yet, even among the older and more open group
of donors, the number willing to continue donating if they could be
traced was low. When asked whether they would continue to donate
if offspring were informed of their identity, only 41% said they
160
would.
Comments from donors about the possibilities of a donor161
child reunion ranged from tentatively positive to violently negative.
Even those modestly in favor of donor “outing” expressed
reservations. As one donor put it, “I think they (donor offspring)
should have that right [to learn donor identity] but perhaps any

157. See Ken Daniels, The Social Responsibility of Gamete Providers, 8 J. COMMUNITY &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 261, 264 (1998) (quoting one commentator who defined a
sperm donor as “‘a man with children in someone else’s family’”).
158. Id. at 268 (listing eleven studies, in Table Two, in which sperm donors were
surveyed as to their willingness to be contacted by offspring created with their
sperm). In two studies, 68% of those surveyed expressed willingness. In another two
studies only 15% and 17% expressed willingness. The average percentage from all
eleven studies was 44%. Interestingly, oocyte donors appeared slightly more open to
future contact with offspring. In four studies, over 50% were willing to be contact by
donor offspring. Id.
159. Daniels, supra note 157, at 269; see also Ken Daniels et al., Information Sharing
in Semen Donation: The Views of Donors, 44 SOC. SCI. & MED. 673, 673-80 (1997)
[hereinafter Daniels et al., Information Sharing] (surveying donors from Clinic A and
Clinic B). Clinic A services predominantly older, married donors with children of
the marriage, while Clinic B services younger, unmarried donors. While 35% of
Clinic A donors expressed strong unhappiness at the thought of being traced by
donor offspring, 73% of Clinic B donors expressed strong unhappiness.
Concomitantly, 52% of Clinic A donors said they would not mind being contacted
while only 9% of Clinic B donors expressed similar equanimity at the prospect. Id.;
see also Ken Daniels, The Semen Providers, in DONOR INSEMINATION: INTERNATIONAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 76, 96 (Ken Daniels & Erica Haimes eds., 1998)
(presenting data on sperm donors indicating that some are motivated by pecuniary
gain, while others are motivated by altruism).
160. See Daniels et al., Information Sharing, supra note 159, at 678 (comparing a
group of younger donors with older donors, which revealed that twice as many
youger donors would be unhappy if they were ever traced by their offspring). In fact,
one donor responded by stating that he would be ‘disgusted.’” Id. See also Lalos
Daniels et al., Recruitment and Motivation of Semen Providers in Sweden, 18 HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 1, 212-16 (2003) (noting that altruism and desire to help infertile
couples are the primary reasons for donation).
161. Daniels et al., Information Sharing, supra note 159, at 678.
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approach should be through a third party . . . I don’t want a begging
162
drug addict landing on my doorstep even if he/she has my DNA[].”
2.

Limits on data applicability to frozen embryo disputes
Sperm donor attitudes toward their offspring do not necessarily
predict the attitudes of objecting spouses in frozen embryo disputes.
Unlike sperm donors, the gamete donors in frozen embryo cases
participated in fertility treatment with the expectation that they
would assume the legal, social, and financial responsibilities of
fatherhood.
This process may have engendered feelings of
connection and expectations of family life that are not inspired by
the process of donating sperm. On the other hand, the data does
show that biological ties can exist absent psychological attachment
and, thus, the courts’ linking of the two is in error.
III. ACCORDING THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE MORE WEIGHT: WOMEN’S
INVESTMENTS IN EXISTING EMBRYOS AND THE PROBLEMS WITH
ADOPTION AND FUTURE ART EFFORTS AS
ALTERNATIVE PATHWAYS TO PARENTHOOD
In frozen embryo cases, the right to procreate has been rendered
increasingly irrelevant. If the parties have signed a contract, the
courts either ignore the contractual terms favoring procreation on
public policy grounds or they contort existing language to dictate
163
embryo destruction.
If no contract exists, the courts revert to a
constitutional analysis that pays lip service to an individual’s interest
in procreation, but consistently finds that interest outmatched by the
164
interest in avoiding procreation.
In weighing these rights, the
courts gloss over substantial investments that women have in existing
embryos and assume that adoption or further technologicallyenhanced attempts to achieve parenthood are both available and
realistic.
A. Investments in Existing Embryos
While both men and women contribute genetic material to create
preembryos, women’s contribution involves far more “sweat equity.”
Men’s donation may be achieved relatively easily and without high162. Id.
163. See supra notes 75-87 and the accompanying text for a discussion of A.Z. v.
B.Z. and J.B. v. M.B., notes 57-74 and the accompanying text for a discussion of Kass
v. Kass, and notes 23-40 and the accompanying text for a discussion of In re the
Marriage of Litowitz v. Litowitz.
164. See supra notes 41-56 and the accompanying text for a discussion of Davis v.
Davis.
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tech interventions. All that is required is a private room, an empty jar
and, perhaps, a Playboy magazine or video. For women, the process
is more arduous.
To induce production of a large number of eggs, donors are
injected intramuscularly with hormones, known as gonadotropins,
165
during a process known as super-ovulation induction. Typical sideeffects from this process include breast tenderness, fluid retention,
mood swings, irritability, and abdominal discomfort.
More
threatening is the risk of ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome
(“OHSS”), which occurs in 1 to 2% of patients undergoing superovulation induction. OHSS is a severe condition, which can lead to
breathing difficulties, temporary kidney non-function, and arterial
and venous thrombosis.
In some instances, it can be life166
threatening.
Additionally, exposure to gonadotropins has been
167
associated with slightly elevated risks of breast-cancer.
If super-ovulation occurs without incident, the egg donor is
readied for egg retrieval, which is accomplished through trans-vaginal
aspiration. This process involves passing a needle through the
vaginal wall and removing the mature egg from the ovarian follicle.
Bleeding and infection of the pelvic area are risks associated with this
168
procedure. Additionally, as with any surgical procedure, the risk of
169
damage or puncture to surrounding organs is ever-present.
The court in Davis referred elliptically to the physical and
emotional strain endured by the wife in contributing her share of the
170
fertilized embryo’s genetic material.
Still, the court felt that the
165. Samuel Smith et al., Diagnosis and Management of Female Infertility, 290 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1767, 1768 (2003).
166. AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, PATIENT’S FACT SHEET: RISKS
INVITRO
FERTILIZATION
(IVF)
(Dec.
1996),
available
at
OF
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/FactSheets/RisksIVF-Fact.pdf.
167. See Ronald Burkman et al., Infertility Drugs and the Risk of Breast Cancer:
Findings from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Women’s
Contraceptive and Reproductive Experiences Study, 79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 844, 848
(2003) (showing that women who took Pergonal had a greater risk of ductal
carcinoma than women who had never taken infertility medication).
168. See Dov Dicker et al., Severe Abdominal Complications After Transvaginal
Ultrasonographically Guided Retrieval of Oocytes for In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer, 59 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1313 (1993) (reporting the severe postoocyte
aspiration problems, including acute abdomen complications); R.S. Howe et al.,
Pelvic Infection After Transvaginal Ultrasound-Guided Ovum Retrieval, 49 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 726, 726-28 (1988) (noting that the patients studied were not “typical”
transvaginal aspiration cases); Bennet et al., Complications of Transvaginal UtrasoundDirected Follicle Aspiration: A Review of 2670 Consecutive Procedures, 10 J. ASSISTED
REPROD. & GENETICS 72, 72-77 (1993) (observing the rarity of complications from the
transvaginal aspiration procedure).
169. Bennet et al., supra note 168, at 72-77.
170. The court further stated that:
We are not unmindful of the fact that the trauma (including both emotional
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wife’s investments were insufficient to outweigh the husband’s
171
In subsequent cases,
interests in having the embryos destroyed.
female investments in existing embryos have gone utterly
unrecognized and ignored. Similarly disregarded is the contraction
of reproductive opportunity that women face with the passage of
time. Frozen embryo disputants who are denied access to their
existing embryos are told by judges to seek parenthood through
172
alternative means.
However, achieving parenthood through
additional ARTs efforts or adoption is not likely to be easily
accomplished, especially for frozen embryo disputants who are
physiologically at risk for conception difficulties and whose status as
an older divorcee will complicate their adoption efforts. These
obstacles to parenthood by alternate means will be discussed below.
B. Difficulties in Achieving Pregnancy Through Additional ART Efforts
For women, age is the enemy of fertility. Women hit their
reproductive prime in their early twenties. Each advancing year
represents a slight decline in the ability to conceive and to carry a
child. Beginning at age thirty-five, the rates at which women fail to
conceive and to suffer miscarriages increase exponentially with every
year. Declines in both egg quality and number, which is associated
with advancing years, lessens the likelihood that future efforts at ART
173
will result in a live pregnancy.
A glance at the success rates of ART clinics confirms this stark
reality. The Advanced Fertility Center of Chicago reports that the
percentage of pregnancies resulting from egg retrieval from women
174
younger than age thirty-five is 71%. That number falls precipitously
175
to 53% for women ages thirty-five to thirty-nine. The rate plummets
176
further to 31% for women ages forty and above. The United States
stress and physical discomfort) to which women are subjected in the IVF
process is more severe than is the impact of the procedure on men. In this
sense, it is fair to say that women contribute more to the IVF process than
men. Their experience, however, must be viewed in light of the joys of
parenthood that is desired or the relative anguish of a lifetime of unwanted
parenthood.
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992).
171. Id. at 603-04.
172. See Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Friedmann, J.,
concurring), aff’d, 696 N.E.2d 174 (1998); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
173. ADVANCED FERTILITY CENTER OF CHICAGO, OVARIAN RESERVE TESTS—
EVALUATION OF EGG QUALITY AND QUANTITY
(2004),
available
at
http://www.advancedfertility.com/testovar.htm.
174. ADVANCED FERTILITY CENTER OF CHICAGO, IVF PREGNANCY RATES (Dec. 2003),
available at http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivfrates.htm.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (“CDC”), which receives data from most
177
fertility clinics operating in the United States, tabulated the average
live birth rates for all ART techniques for women of different ages
178
using their own fresh, fertilized eggs.
As the reporting authors
noted, “[a] woman’s age is the most important factor affecting the
179
chances of a live birth when her own eggs are used.” The live birth
rate per transfer procedure for women younger than age thirty-five
180
was 33%. For women ages thirty-five to thirty-seven, the percentage
181
dropped six points to 27%.
For women age forty and above, the
182
For women over age
live birth transfer rate topped off at 10%.
183
forty-two, the rate fell to a dismal 4%.
The passage of time impairs a woman’s procreative capacity on a
number of levels. As the CDC data demonstrates, increasing age
diminishes reproductive functioning at each stage of the ART
process. That is, as women age, they are less likely to respond to
ovarian stimulation and to produce viable eggs for retrieval. In
addition, even those eggs that are retrieved are less likely to survive
fertilization and transfer. An older woman is less likely to achieve
pregnancy once the eggs are implanted into their tubes or uterus.
And, as the age of a woman increases, the likelihood of carrying a
184
fetus to term decreases.
Against this ever-increasing risk of childlessness, the creation of
cryopreserved frozen embryos serves as partial insurance. With
embryos already safely retrieved and fertilized, women are insulated
from fear about their waning capacity to produce viable eggs. Secure
in the knowledge that the embryos exist for future use, their owners
need not take additional precautions such as freezing eggs or
retrieving additional eggs for fertilization with anonymous donors.
Had these women known that marital discord would place their
177. From January 1, 2000 to December 30, 2000, 408 medical centers performed
ART procedures, of which 383 provided data to the CDC. See VICTORIA C. WRIGHT ET
AL., ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES, 2000 (Aug.
29,
2003),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss
5209a1.htm.
178. Id.
179. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2000 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES:
NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS § 2 (Sept. 11, 2003) (referencing
Figure
10),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/ART00/
section2a.htm.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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existing embryos beyond reach, they may have sought to secure
additional collateral against the threat of childlessness. In according
the right to avoid procreation preeminent weight, the courts have
chosen to disregard women’s reliance interest in existing embryos.
This judicial disregard is all the more stunning given the problematic
nature of the alternatives facing older women who seek parenthood.
This Article will now turn to the next imperfect alternative.
C. Difficulties, Risks, and Costs in Achieving Parenthood
Through Adoption
Both the Davis and Kass courts suggested that the feuding spouse
seeking to avoid procreation should, in the vast majority of situations,
prevail because the other spouse possesses reasonable alternate
185
routes to parenthood, including adoption.
The courts’ cavalier
inclusion of adoption as a reasonable alternative to embryo
implantation ignores the difficulties facing older, single individuals
who seek to adopt.
There are three routes by which one may adopt a child. None are
risk or burden-free and the burdens are multiplied for aging single
women. The first and least expensive way to adopt a child is through
a public agency. Public adoption agencies are charged with the
186
placement of children who are in the care of the state.
While
healthy Caucasian infants find their way into the state system, the
187
demand for these “desirable” infants far exceeds the supply.
Contraceptive use, abortion and the increasing social acceptability of
single parenthood have led to a decline in the number of infants
188
being relinquished for adoption domestically.
Concomitantly,
185. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (1992) (suggesting that Mrs. Davis
should pursue adoption to fulfill her desire for the “child-rearing aspects of
parenthood” and noting that adoption was a viable option for her because she and
her ex-husband once pursued adoption); Kass v. Kass, 235 A.D.2d 150, 167 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997) (opining that adoption is a reasonable alternative to pre-zygote
implantation).
186. See CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WILLIAM L. PIERCE, PH.D., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ADOPTION 35-38 (1991).
187. See generally Devon Brooks et al., Preferred Characteristics of Children in Need of
Adoption: Is There a Demand for Available Foster Children?, 76 SOC. SERV. REV. 575, 577
(2002) (noting that only 32% of children waiting for adoption are Caucasian and
that African American children are one-fifth as likely as Caucasian children to be
adopted). See also NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK:
UNITED STATES DATE, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 126 (1989) (reporting that
over one-half of the children in foster care are minorities and that more than 50% of
the African American children in foster care have been there for more than two
years, whereas only one-third of white children remained in foster care for the same
length of time).
188. See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 186, at 160 (explaining that there are an
insufficient number of infants available for adoption).
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women’s increasing involvement in the professional sphere, which
has lead to delayed childbearing and to heightened problems with
infertility, has increased the numbers of adults interested in
adopting. Thus, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, a
mismatch exists between the numbers of parents seeking to adopt
and the number of children eligible for adoption.
When public adoption agencies have a healthy, white child, they
first look to place that child with a married couple and will only look
189
to a single person as a secondary option.
Some agencies will not
allow singletons to receive infants and, instead, choose to limit singles
190
to the older “special needs” children.
These children may be
physically or mentally handicapped, a member of a sibling group,
191
older or behaviorally hard to handle.
Typically, a single would-be
parent must be willing to either accept these “hard to place” children
or wait years for a healthy infant who has not spent time in the fostercare environment. Even when a match is made, existing laws and
regulations tilt heavily in favor of the birth parents’ right to
192
Birth mothers are generally provided anywhere from
reconsider.
three days to several weeks post-birth to change their minds and, in
some states, it may be years before the adoptive arrangement
193
becomes immune from legal challenge.

189. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, supra note 187, at 162 (reporting
that, for every available baby, there are approximately fifty to a hundred infertile
couples seeking to adopt and that birth mothers express a preference for their child
to be adopted by a married couple, and thus single persons seeking to adopt are at a
disadvantage); see also ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 186, at 263-64 (describing the
challenges faced by single persons seeking to adopt, including the refusal of some
adoption agencies to accept applications from single adoptive parents and the
policies of other agencies that only consider single adoptive parents “for the most
difficult to place children”).
190. ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 186, at 269.
191. Id. at 266-69. One commentator has reported that:
[m]ost of the boys and girls living in America’s foster-care system were
removed from parents who severely mistreated them, neglected them, or
abused alcohol and drugs so intensively themselves that they could barely
function. . . . [M]ore than 117,000 of them—teenagers who have bounced
into and out of innumerable foster homes, infants with emotional or physical
disabilities, babies born to prostitutes and people with HIV, and children of
all ages who are black, Hispanic, of mixed race, or possess other “special
needs”—are available for adoption.
HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS
ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION:
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 157 (2000).
192. See Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real Thing, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1150
(2003) (explaining that state laws vary as to how much time the birth mother is given
to revoke adoption and that a balancing must occur between the rights of the
biological parents as well as those of the adoptive parents).
193. Id. (indicating that, in some states, the biological mother can revoke her
consent to the adoption at any time up until the entry of the final adoption order).
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Adopting through a private agency or independently, using only an
attorney or a physician as an intermediary, is also a possibility in most
194
However, all private agencies have their own requirements
states.
regarding age, marital status and income that may exclude older
single mothers. Additionally, some agencies and intermediaries allow
the birth parents to select the child’s parent(s) from a pool of
applicants, and intact infertile couples are usually chosen before
single parents. Private agency adoptions can range in cost between
$10,000 to $25,000, with the costs fluctuating based on the race of the
baby, the degree to which the agency supports the costs of the
pregnancy, the delivery, and the percentage of birth mothers who
change their minds. Independently arranged adoptions may be
slightly less expensive but, in the event that the birth mother changes
her mind, the financial losses are absorbed entirely by the adoptive
195
parent and not by the agency.
Untenable waits, restrictions and legal uncertainty drive some
parents to adopt abroad. This option, however, poses burdens of its
own. First, most countries require adoptive parents to retrieve the
196
children in their country of origin, which increases costs and fees.
Second, children adopted from other lands typically have spent from
several weeks to several months in orphanages receiving varying levels
197
and quality of care.
Little health information is provided and, in
many instances, this information is falsified to increase the child’s
198
Maternal malnutrition, drug or alcohol use,
chance for adoption.
HIV status, and hepatitis all threaten the child’s long-term
199
development.
Physically healthy children may develop
194. While all states permit private adoption agencies, independent adoption is
illegal in Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts and North Dakota. ADAMEC &
PIERCE, supra note 186, at 153.
195. See LEE VARON, ADOPTING ON YOUR OWN: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO ADOPTING
AS A SINGLE PARENT 189-91 (2000) (delineating the disadvantages of independent
private domestic adoption, including both the emotional and the financial losses that
could result).
196. Id. at 212 (explaining that international adoptions require adoptive parents
to travel to adopt the child and that some countries even require a lengthy stay or
multiple trips).
197. Id. at 201 (noting that “the circumstances in which a child of another country
is living can vary wildly”). Some children are fortunate and are placed in “well-run
orphanages or loving foster homes” but less fortunate children “may live in substandard institutions where they have received little nurturing and almost no one-toone interaction with a caregiver.” Id.
198. Id. at 200-01 (revealing that, although it is important to obtain as much
information about an adopted child as possible, in international adoption such
information is not available or is inaccurate because some “agency personnel . . .
purposely exaggerate medical conditions in order to influence local authorities to
release a child for adoption”).
199. See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 186, at 39-43, 194-96.

WALDMAN.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

2004]

10/3/2004 5:35 PM

THE PARENT TRAP

1059

psychological deficits if they spend their first months of life
warehoused in overrun state orphanages. Neglect in the early stages
places these children at risk of developing attachment disorders that
interfere with their ability to bond, to trust, and to empathize with
200
others.
These children are said to be “without a conscience” and
201
can cause havoc on the adoptive family that seeks to shelter them.
Becoming a parent via any mechanism is a risky enterprise. No
guarantee promises that existing embryos, if implanted, will lead to a
healthy birth. Still, on almost any measure, implantation constitutes
a far smoother road to parenthood. Adoption, especially for single
older women, is an expensive process fraught with the potential for
protracted delay and ultimate disappointment. Foreign adoption
programs can shut down, birth mothers can reclaim their babies, and
children who appear fine at first blush may be afflicted with the
physical or the emotional mark of early neglect or mistreatment.
Adoption is costlier, more burdensome, and presents a higher risk
for heartbreak than does the implantation of existing embryos. It is
not a comparable alternative. Judicial affinity for this “solution”
reveals both insensitivity to the frozen embryo litigants’ parental
aspirations and a profound inattention to the real-world barriers that
threaten their fulfillment.
CONCLUSION
Frozen embryo cases resist easy answers. This Article has argued
that courts stray when they presume that parties seeking to avoid
unwanted genetic links should prevail in frozen embryo disputes. It
examined the courts’ premise that the creation of biological ties
presages a life of psychological bondage and found it empirically
unsupported. At the same time, it argued that courts’ existing
treatment of the right to procreate undervalues women’s investments
in existing embryos and the difficulties attendant upon seeking
parenthood through other means. Presumptions are inappropriate
in the frozen embryo context where careful and fact-sensitive analysis
is necessary to fairly assess the interests at stake.
Reform in this area requires, first, that state legislatures clarify the
financial obligations of those who would wish to implant frozen
embryos over their ex-spouses’ objection and, second, that the courts
adopt guidelines that more equitably assess the parties’ competing
reproductive interests. To eliminate the possibility that an objecting
200. See id. at 171-73.
201. Id.
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spouse might be saddled with the financial support of a child whose
birth he or she sought to avoid, state legislatures should make clear
that a divorcing spouse who objects to the implantation of embryos
created during the marriage should be treated like a gamete donor
and not like a parent. Indeed, statutes in Texas, Colorado, and
202
Washington provide models for future efforts.
Once courts are assured that ordering embryo implantation will
not create the moral hazard of one party fighting for a parent-child
relationship that the other must fund, they can focus more on the
essence of the parties’ interests in achieving and in avoiding
procreation. Shorn of the financial overlay, the interest of the party
seeking to avoid procreation rests entirely on the psychological
burdens of “forced parenthood.” As argued earlier, this interest
deserves consideration, but it should not trump all countervailing
concerns. In assessing the strength of this interest, courts should be
open to individualized showings of harm but also should be mindful
that social science investigations suggest that, for most adults,
psychological parenthood does not necessarily flow from a biological
connection.
In considering the interests of the party seeking to procreate,
courts should take seriously the physical and emotional trauma
inherent in a woman’s participation in ARTs and the obstacles
impeding efforts to become a parent through other means. This
does not mean that a woman’s desire to preserve existing embryos for
use should always prevail. While courts have yet to elucidate fully the
core values that they seek to protect in upholding the “right to
procreate,” it is clear that the sanctity of the bond that links adults
and the children that they nurture stands at the center of that right.
As the Supreme Court stated in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the right to
203
procreate is essential to the survival of the human race.
This
statement could be read literally as referencing our biological
imperatives as well as gesturing more poetically to the transfiguring
effect of parent-child bonds on both individuals and society. When
202. The Texas statute makes it clear that:
If a marriage is dissolved before placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the
former spouse is not a parent of the resulting child unless the former spouse
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after a
divorce, the former spouse would be a parent of the child. . . . The consent
of a former spouse to assisted reproduction may be withdrawn by that
individual in a record at any time before placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.706 (Vernon 2003); accord COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4106 (West 2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.725 (West 2003).
203. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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assigning weight to the myriad of interests that the women and men
in frozen embryo cases seek to fulfill in frozen embryo disputes,
courts should accord substantial weight only to those interests that lie
at the heart of the parent-child bond sheltered by the Constitution.
Thus, women who seek to use existing embryos to achieve genetic
parenthood should be accorded the greatest judicial deference, while
women who seek to donate their embryos to other infertile couples
should be accorded significantly less interest. The right to procreate
is not assignable, and, as the Davis court recognized, when embryos
are sought for donation, an objecting spouse’s desire to halt embryo
transfer should prevail.
Although women shoulder the bulk of the physical labor in
producing fertilized embryos and over time tend to suffer the greater
constriction of reproductive opportunity, this does not mean that
men’s interests in obtaining existing embryos to achieve genetic
parenthood should be ignored. As argued earlier, courts should
consider, on a case-by-case basis, the would-be parent’s opportunities
to seek parenthood through alternative means. While, typically, men
204
are able to produce motile sperm well into their seventies,
treatment for prostate cancer or other illnesses may impair or destroy
205
a man’s reproductive capacity. In that situation, a man’s interest in
using existing embryos to achieve genetic parenthood is as
compelling as that of the aging divorcee who can no longer produce
viable eggs. The interests of the infertile parent should be accorded
considerable weight when balanced against the other parent’s
protests.
In sum, I support greater empathy for, and judicial deference to,
the interests of would-be mothers and fathers in frozen embryo
disputes. Generally speaking, women’s investments in existing
embryos and their lack of alternative reproductive opportunities
counsel in favor of treating women’s interests in using existing
embryos to achieve genetic parenthood with special care and
concern. A spouse who seeks to block such usage should be required
to offer concrete evidence of harm apart from the generalized
204. See Ernesto Gallardo et al., Effect of Age on Sperm Fertility Potential: Oocyte
Donation as a Model, 66 FERTILITY & STERILITY 260, 263 (1996) (observing that
“fertilization ability is not affected by age in males, as has been demonstrated in
women”).
205. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, TREATMENT TOPICS & RESOURCES, WILL MY SEXUAL
FUNCTION & FERTILITY BE AFFECTED?, at http://www.cancer.org/docroot/MIT
content/MIT_7_2X_Will_My_Sexual_Function_and_Fertility_Be_Affected.asp?sitear
ea=MIT) (2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (noting some of
the risks associated with chemotherapy, such as a reduced number and motility of
sperm cells, that can result in temporary or permanent infertility).
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assertions of psychological harm to which the courts have, thus far,
been so receptive. Such a showing should also be required when a
male gamete donor seeks to use existing embryos to achieve genetic
parenthood and can demonstrate that future reproductive efforts will
not likely succeed.
Current judicial treatment of reproductive aspirations in frozen
embryo disputes is heavily tilted in favor of the party seeking to avoid
“coerced reproduction.” This is due in large part to the courts’
concern that a parent who is unsuccessful in blocking embryo
development could find himself or herself financially obligated and
psychologically burdened by the resulting child. However, the threat
of financial servitude could be removed by legislation releasing the
objecting spouses from the obligation to provide support.
Additionally, the threat of psychological bondage is a product of the
courts’ collective imagination. Investigations into post-divorce and
non-marital childbearing and into sperm donation reveal that the
psychological connections flowing from genetic links are tenuous and
contingent and not absolute and pre-determined. The time is long
past for the courts to abandon the myth of “the parent trap.” With a
more accurate and realistic approach to the complex character of
psychological parenthood, courts could move toward a more just and
balanced approach to frozen embryo disputes. With both assisted
reproduction and divorce seemingly permanent fixtures of our family
law landscape, we only can hope that the courts will begin their
journey sooner rather than later.

